In the time of Descartes, philosophers on both sides of the English Channel inhabited the same universe of discourse, were concerned with the same range of questions and argued about them in mutually intelligible ways. Descarte's own central concern, of course, was questions of certainty, knowledge and truth; as Anthony Kenny has put it, "his whole philosophy can be described as "the search for truth'." Within the world of analytic philosophy students of my generation were brought up with very much the same view of what philosophy should be about. Given the basically empiricist commitments of our training, however, we were unable to give much credence to the different claims made by different philosophers on the alleged basis of direct rational insight, but were taught to insist on conceptually or logically compel¬ ling demonstration of the soundness of explicit argument structures. Reason in philosophy was thus for us essentially a matter of argument and careful conceptual analysis. Good stu¬ dents sought to mark themselves out by their ability to detect and to criticize arguments in the texts that they had to study and to produce effective arguments of their own; these were, and to a very large extent still are, the main criteria (apart from a proper knowledge of their mate¬ rial) on the basis of which they must expect to be assessed in examination at whatever level. But when, in the hope of challenging our own established authorities, we turned to the locally ostracized writings of so-called 'continental' philosophers, we were in general both baffled and frustrated to find ourselves unable to work out just what they were trying to argue.
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This assumption -that philosophical productions were to be judged on the basis of the explicit arguments and argument structures that they contained-was fundamental to our understanding of the very nature of philosophy. We were familiar, of course, with disagree¬ ments as to the acceptable limits within within different types of such structures were pro¬ perly to be recognized as such; were the proper criteria to be recognized as those of formal logic alone, or should we be ready to recognise a whole variety of modes of informal logic, of contextual implications, of material rules of inference, of conversational implicatures or what¬ ever? But all were agreed that without some such controlling framework of rules of argu¬ ment, anyone might say or write anything that came into his or her head in an entirely arbitrary manner; for nothing would count as a better or worse reason for any on affirmation rather than another. This alone goes a long way towards explaining why we felt in general so uncomfort¬ able with, for example, texts which started out with much talk of "the phenomenological meth¬ od', but then proceeded to present a series of descriptions of one sort and another without, so far as we could detect, also producing any methodically set out arguments designed to justify those descriptions as correct or true.1 (As any sort of overall assessment of "continental phi¬ losophy' this was, of course, no better informed or more generally illuminating than the simi¬ larly summary and dismissive asssessments that most "continental' philosophers of that time 1 As Husserl himself characteristically put it in his Preface to the English edition ofldeen, "Eidetic pheno¬ menology is restricted in this book to the realm of pure eidetic 'description', that is to the realm of essential struc¬ tures of transcendental subjectivity immediately transparent to the mind... Thus no attempt is made to carry out systematically the transcendental knowledge that can be obtaint through logical deduction." Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pwv Phenomenology, translated by W.R.Boyce Gibson (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1931 ) , p. 12.
would have provided of the sort of philosophy that was then being produced in the so-called analytic world.)
If one conceives of the rationality of philosophical discourse as thus depending on fine conceptual distinctions and on the logical status of the argument structures around and on which it is built, and of the order of these arguments as being determined by properly atemporal rules of inference, whether formal, informal or material, one may well find dificully in appreciating what is going on in the texts of those for whom the rationality of such discourse is to be understood essentially in terms of the actual practice of reasoning. By this expression I mean something other than "the practice of reason' understood as referring to the working out of some sort of principle of rationality in human history in general. So what is one to be understood, what is one to understand oneself, as trying to do in producing philosophy -philosophical texts, philosophical lectures, philosophical teaching, phi¬ losophical reflection, whether solitary or in communing with others, in short in producing philosophical discourse? Is one seeking rationally convincing answers to rationally formulated questions, answers that may cany satisfactory conviction to oneself or secure, maybe, the ratio¬ nal assent of others? Or is one trying to persuade, to modify or to sustain certain dispositional beliefs and other attitudes by all the devices at one's disposal? Or, to put the point another way, is on simply concerned with conceptual content and the realions (essentially timeless, as one might say) between meanings, relations of implication, entailment or exclusion by virtue of contradiction, or is one concerned with all the (causal) forces at work in the place and time ofone's arguments? Even the most rationally minded of analytic philosophers would readly acknow¬ ledge that such forces must be at work whenever they give a tutorial or a lecture, publish a text or otherwise engage in the business of 'doing philosophy'. But most would insist that it was no part of their business as philosophers to try to take account in the shaping of their teaching, writing or lecturing of any such causally contingent and, as such, 'non-rational' forces.
None of this is to say that there have not been significant attempts on the part of 'AngloSaxon' philosophers to provide causal analyses of belief, of meaningful signs or of the ways in which intentions or reasons may be understood as efficient causes of events. There are also examples of philosophers, prominent within the analytic field, who quite explicitly set out to influence those to whom they address themselves not so much by the logically constraining force of their arguments as by nudging them into addressing certain problems or puzzles from a different perspective. Such philosophers have characteristically proceeded not by setting out theses and seeking to establish them as true on the basis or rationally compelling argument, but by encouraging people to look at matters in such and such a way rather than in some other. But, it is fair to say, for the most part this intellectual therapy proceeds by raising questions and adducing considerations designed to cast 'rational' doubt on the tenability of long-held assumptions and to incite to the elaboration of fresh conceptual approaches, that is to say by offering fresh material for discursive thought. And to the extent that the characteristic style of writings in the manner of, say, the later Wittgenstein, is to be considered as integral to the exercise of the philosopher has proven to constitute an exception that the world of analytic philosophy has in general found hard to digest.
To sum up this stage of my argument, then: -It would occur only to a liny minority of philosophers working within the tradition within which I was myself brought up to try-and cons¬ truct their lectures or their texts in the light of such awareness as they might have of the proba¬ ble wider causal impacts of titer 'speech performance". Or if they did so, it would be. as they would be, as they would see it, with other than philosophical purposes in view. Rational argu¬ ments, as we have noted, may be checked for their validity; and if valid, they will be so univer¬ sally. The atemporality, the contingent particularity and the causal situatedness of ("practical") In short, if, indeed, the truthfulness of an act of communication lies in the seriously con¬ ceived intention of would-be communicators to secure the uptake of that which they believe to be true, it must depend upon their readiness and ability to adapt their message to the contin¬ gently particular conditions of its context of transmission. Thus, if truth aspires in some sense to the universal, truthfulness can not, but is bound in its expression -and if it is to be true to itself, as one might say, must recognise itself as so bound-to the particular.
(ii) Integrity. A number of those who have written on the 'transcendental presuppositions' of standard discourse (Paul Grice, Patrick Nowell Smith) have pointed out that the hearer or reader is normally entitled to presume that the speaker or writer himself believes such asser¬ tions as he may be led to make to be true; in other words, that standard discourse proceeds on the assumption of the truthfulness of those who speak. Learning to speak necessarily includes lessons in the recognition of those conventions which serve as signals that a particular discur¬ sive context is to be taken as in some way non-standard and that this assumption (of truth¬ fulness) is not to be taken as holding. For example, when young children are first taken to the theatre, they not infrequently take the actors actually to be the characters that thye are repre¬ senting and, hence, actually to believe, in propia persona as it were, the assertions provided for them by the script, but it is clear that no experienced theatre-goer would ever make such a mistake.
To assume the truthfulness of one's interlocutor Is, however, In effect to make at the same time a certain number of further assumptions about him. If someone tells me of his belief in the validity of a certain line of argumentation and in the truth of the conclusions to which it leads, I am less likely to lend credence to him if he has only yesterday assured me of a contrary belief; and even less likely to do so, if 1 see no reason to suppose that he is tomorrow likely to believe in the validity of the same set of arguments or in the truth of the same conclusions. It is not so much that I necessarily be should led to suspect him of dissembling or of a lack of truthfulness as that to lay claim to a belief is to commit oneself in certain ways, which is in turn to presu¬ me to a certain kind of stability through time. This stability is not to be confounded with a sto¬ lid cognitive immobility. There are many propositions whose truth I should now be prepared to affirm while being equally ready to acknowledge that I might quite possibly come sooner or later to change my mind. But for my present affirmation to count as one of a serious belief, there has to be a reasonable assumption that, should I in fact come to change my mind, it will only be on the basis of some equally serious reconsideration of the grounds on which my pre¬ vious belief was based. This, of course, is also to presume an appropriate weight of continuity between my present self as believer in the truth of p and my hypothetical future self, who may have come, on the basis of a certain follow-through of reflection, to reject that belief.
These presumptions may very appropriately be regarded as amounthing in sum to a pre¬ sumption of integrity. 'Integrity" is a term that has recently seen a remarkable degree of not always very precise public use. The Oxford English Dictionary provides us with the following account: "1. .." The underlying theme of both accounts is that of an original wholeness, and the consequential theme of moral soundness is that of someone who is, as the English idiom has it, "all of a piece', whose fundamental honesty and reliability spring from the fact that he (or she) has no hidden discordances such as to make for an unpredictable changeability over time or from one context to another. In highlighting the reference to origins both dictionaries are doubtless faithful to the origins of the concept of integrity itself. Nowadays, however, it would probably be more common to think of the wholeness of integrity as a task or a goal at which to aim, even as one knows that there can be no possible assurance that one has ever definitively achieved it. (Nor has it necessarily to be supposed that a man of integrity will never dissemble. A secret agent, for example, may be professionally committed to a life of deception, but such commitments may be entered into on the basis of a more fun¬ damental and persisting commitment that provides the framework of constancy to his life.) There is, as we have just noted, no necessary loss of integrity involved in the more fact ofchanging either one's mind or one's tactics, so long as the change is made on seriously reflected grounds; on the contrary, a man of integrity mus be prepared to change his mind when con¬ fronted with convincing evidence that he had previously been mistaken. The soundness and stability of integrity are not to be confused with mere immobility or rigidity as such: they are rallier a matter of constancy of underlying principle and purpose, of steadiness of direction, and 
